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Abstract: Wholesale electricity market designs in practice do not provide the market participants
with adequate mechanisms to hedge their financial risks. Demanders and suppliers will likely
face even greater risks with the deepening penetration of variable renewable resources like wind
and solar. This paper explores the design of a centralized cash-settled call option market to
mitigate such risks. A cash-settled call option is a financial instrument that allows its holder the
right to claim a monetary reward equal to the positive difference between the real-time price
of an underlying commodity and a pre-negotiated strike price for an upfront fee. Through an
example, we illustrate that a bilateral call option can reduce the payment volatility of market
participants. Then, we design a centralized clearing mechanism for call options that generalizes
the bilateral trade. We illustrate through an example how the centralized clearing mechanism
generalizes the bilateral trade. Finally, the effect of risk preference of the market participants,
as well as some generalizations are discussed.
Keywords: Electricity Markets, Call Options, Mechanism Design, Stackelberg Equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTION
Various states in the U.S. and countries around the world
have adopted aggressive targets for the integration of re-
newable energy resources. Wind and solar energy are two
of the most prominent resources. The inherent variabil-
ity of these resources makes it difficult to maintain the
balance of demand and supply of power at all times. By
variable, we mean they are uncertain (errors in day-ahead
forecasts are significantly higher than those in bulk power
demand), intermittent (shows large ramps over short time
horizons), and non-dispatchable (output cannot be varied
on command). See Bird et al. (2013) for a comprehensive
discussion on the challenges of renewable integration.
Energy is typically procured in advance to meet the de-
mand requirements. Forward planning is necessary since
many generators – such as the ones based on nuclear
technology or coal – cannot alter their outputs arbitrar-
ily fast to track demand requirements; some lead time
is necessary. In its simplest abstraction, one can model
the system operation to proceed in two stages: a forward
stage, conducted a day or a few hours in advance, and the
real-time stage. Roughly, the forward stage optimizes the
dispatch against a forecast of the demand and supply con-
ditions at real-time. The impending deviation from such
forecasts are then balanced in real-time. While demand
forecasts even a day in advance are within 1-3% accuracy,
the same forecasts in the availability of variable renewable
resources can be significantly higher; they can be as high
as 12% 1 For more details on the statistics, see Bird et al.
(2013). Variability in supply from resources like wind and
1 Some promising forecasting techniques have been known to reduce
the forecast error further to 6-8% over large geographical regions.
solar exposes market participants to increased financial
risks. The forward market design in practice does not
allow participants in the wholesale market to adequately
hedge their financial risks. This paper proposes a financial
instrument for the same. The deepening penetration of
variable renewable supply will increase the volatility in
payments to market participants and hence, increase the
financial risks borne by market participants (see Wang
et al. (2011); Cochran et al. (2013)). One needs to better
design the financial instruments to mitigate such risks.
Electricity market participants engage in trading financial
derivatives, i.e., instruments that derive their values based
on the prices in the wholesale market. Traded financial
derivatives in practice include electricity forwards, futures,
swaps, and options. See Deng and Oren (2006); Kovacevic
and Pflug (2014); Kluge (2006) and the references therein.
Some are traded on an exchange and many are traded
bilaterally.
In this paper, we consider how an intermediary (called
the ‘market maker’) can convene a financial market for
trading in cash-settled call options, and how such a finan-
cial market can reduce payment volatilities of wholesale
electricity market participants. Upon buying one unit of a
cash-settled call option at a negotiated option price, the
buyer is entitled to receive a cash payment equal to the
real-time price of a commodity (that is electricity in our
case) less the negotiated strike price. In order to apply the
market design to electricity markets, we adopt an economic
dispatch and pricing model in Section 2 to provide us with
a real-time (spot) price of electricity. Then, we use that
model on a stylized example in Section 3 and illustrate
that a bilateral trade in cash settled call-options between
a renewable power producer and a dispatchable peaker
power plant can lower their respective payment volatilities.
We recognize that engaging in multiple bilateral option
trades on a daily basis will likely be difficult in a practical
electricity market setting, and will adversely affect the liq-
uidity of such trades. 2 The remedy we offer is a centralized
market clearing mechanism for call options in Section 4 for
its use among electricity market participants. Such a mech-
anism will make option trading more viable in practice and
attractive to market participants. We delineate the salient
features and discuss possible generalizations of our design
in Section 5, and and we conclude in Section 6.
Our proposed mechanism is compatible with alternate
wholesale electricity market designs, as given in Wong
and Fuller (2007); Pritchard et al. (2010); Bouffard et al.
(2005a,b); Bose (2015). Even with different designs, mar-
ket participants can have incentives to strategize their
actions in the electricity market and the option trade to-
gether. 3 Such interactions can adversely affect the market
outcomes. However, we relegate such considerations for
future work.
Notation: We let R denote the set of real numbers,
and R+ (resp. R++) denote the set of nonnegative (resp.
positive) numbers. For z ∈ R, we let z+ := max{z, 0}. We
let E[Z] denote the expectation of a random variable Z.
For any set Z, we denote its cardinality by |Z|. For an
event E , we denote its probability by P{E} for a suitably
defined probability measure P. The indicator function for
an event E is given by
1{E} :=
{
1, if E occurs,
0, otherwise.
In any optimization problem, a decision variable x at
optimality is denoted by x∗.
2. DESCRIBING THE MARKETPLACE
The wholesale electricity market is comprised of consumers
and producers of electricity. The consumers in this mar-
ket are the load-serving entities that represent the retail
customers they serve within their geographical footprint.
Examples of such load-serving entities are the utility com-
panies and retail aggregators. Bulk power generators are
the producers in this market. We distinguish between two
sets of generators. The first type is a dispatchable gener-
ator that can alter its output within its capabilities on
command. Such generators are fuel based; e.g., they run
on nuclear technology, or fossil fuels like coal or natural
gas, or dispatchable renewable resources such as biomass
or hydro power. The second type is a variable renew-
able power producer. Its available capacity of production
depends on an intermittent resource like wind or solar
irradiance. The system operator, denoted by SO, imple-
ments a centralized market mechanism that determines the
production and consumption of each market participant
and their compensations. It does so in a way that balances
demand with supply, and the power injections across the
2 As such, markets for financial derivatives associated with elec-
tricity markets have been known to suffer from low liquidity. For
example, see de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013).
3 We refer to Ledgerwood and Pfeifenberger (2013); Prete and
Hogan (2014) for discussions on how market participants can strate-
gize their actions across the electricity markets and their associated
financial instruments.
grid induce feasible power flows over the transmission
lines. Most electricity markets in the United States have
a locational marginal pricing based compensation scheme.
In this paper, we ignore the transmission constraints of
the grid and hence, describe an electricity market with
a marginal pricing scheme. Generalizing this work to the
case with a network is left for future work.
Modeling uncertainty in supply: To model uncertainty in
supply conditions, we consider a two-period market model
as follows. Let t = 0 denote the ex-ante stage, prior to
the uncertainty being realized. At this stage, one only has
forecasts of the uncertain parameters. The uncertainty is
realized at t = 1, the ex-post stage. One can identify t = 0
as the day-ahead stage and t = 1 as the real-time stage
in electricity market operations. Let (Ω,F ,P) denote the
probability space, describing the uncertainty. Here, Ω is
the collection of possible scenarios at t = 1 (which could
be uncountably infinite) 4 , F is a suitable σ-algebra over
Ω, and P is a probability distribution over Ω. We assume
that all market participants know P.
Modeling the market participants: Let d denote the
aggregate inflexible demand that is accurately known a
day in advance 5 . Let G and R denote the collection of
dispatchable generators and variable renewable power pro-
ducers, respectively. We model their individual capabilities
as follows.
• Let each dispatchable generator g ∈ G produce xωg in
scenario ω ∈ Ω. We model its ramping capability by
letting |xωg − x0g| ≤ ℓg, where x0g is a generator set point
that is decided ex-ante, and ℓg is the ramping limit. Let
the installed capacity of generator g be xcapg , and hence
xωg ∈ [0, xcapg ]. Its cost of production is given by the
smooth convex increasing map cg : [0, x
cap
g ]→ R+.• Each variable renewable power producer r ∈ R produces
xωr in scenario ω ∈ Ω. It has no ramping limitations, but
its available production capacity is random, and we have
xωr ∈ [0, xωr ] ⊆ [0, xcapr ]. That is, xωr denotes the random
available capacity of production, and xcapr denotes the
installed capacity for r. Similar to a dispatchable gener-
ator, the cost of production for r is given by the smooth
convex increasing map cr : [0, x
cap
r ]→ R+.
We call a vector comprised of xg for each g ∈ G and xr
for each r ∈ R a dispatch.
Conventional dispatch and pricing model: The SO bal-
ances demand and supply of power in each scenario. It de-
termines the dispatch and the compensations of all market
participants. In the remainder of this section, we describe
the so-called conventional dispatch and pricing scheme.
This market mechanism serves as a useful benchmark
for electricity market designs under uncertainty, e.g., in
Morales et al. (2014, 2012).
We assume that the SO knows cg, x
cap
g for each g ∈ G and
xr, x
cap
r , xr for each r ∈ R. In practice, the cost functions
are derived from supply offers from the generators. The
4 In this paper, we use “distribution” and “measure” interchange-
ably, as appropriate.
5 Day-ahead demand forecasts in practice are typically quite accu-
rate. Notwithstanding the availability of such forecasts, our work can
be extended to account for demand uncertainties.
market participants, in general, may have incentives to
misrepresent their cost functions. Analyzing the effects of
such strategic behavior is beyond the scope of this paper.
The day-ahead stage: The SO computes a forward dis-
patch against a point forecast of all uncertain parameters.
In particular, the SO replaces the random available capac-
ity xωr by a certainty surrogate x
CE
r ∈ [0, xcapr ] for each
r ∈ R, and computes the forward dispatch by solving
minimize
∑
g∈G
cg(Xg) +
∑
r∈R
cr(Xr),
subject to
∑
g∈G
Xg +
∑
r∈R
Xr = d,
Xg ∈ [0, xcapg ], Xr ∈ [0, xCEr ],
for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R,
over Xg ∈ R, g ∈ G, and Xr ∈ R, r ∈ R. A popular
surrogate 6 is given by xCEr := E[x
ω
r ].
The forward price is given by the optimal Lagrange multi-
plier of the energy balance constraint. Denoting this price
by P ∗, generator g ∈ G is paid P ∗X∗G, while producer
r ∈ R is paid P ∗X∗r . Aggregate consumer pays P ∗d.
At real-time: Scenario ω is realized, and the SO solves
minimize
∑
g∈G
cg(x
ω
g ) +
∑
r∈R
cr(x
ω
r ),
subject to
∑
g∈G
xωg +
∑
r∈R
xωr = d,
xωg ∈ [0, xcapg ], |xωg −X∗g | ≤ ℓg,
xωr ∈ [0, xω ], for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R,
over xωg ∈ R, g ∈ G and xωr ∈ R, r ∈ R. The real-time
(or spot) price is again defined by the optimal Lagrange
multiplier of the energy balance constraint, and is denoted
by pω,∗ ∈ R+. Note that the optimal X∗g computed at
t = 0 defines the generator set-points x0g for each generator
g ∈ G. Generator g ∈ G is paid pω,∗ (xω,∗g −X∗g ), while
producer r ∈ R is paid pω,∗ (xω,∗r −X∗r ). The aggregate
consumer does not have any real-time payments, since
there is no deviation in the demand.
The total payments to each participant is the sum of her
forward and the real-time payments. Call these payments
as πωg for each g ∈ G and πωr for each r ∈ R in scenario ω.
We remark that the conventional dispatch model generally
defines a suboptimal forward dispatch in the sense that the
generator set-points are not optimized to minimize the ex-
pected aggregate costs of production. Several authors have
advocated a so-called stochastic economic dispatch model,
wherein the forward set-points are optimized against the
expected real-time cost of balancing. See Wong and Fuller
(2007); Pritchard et al. (2010); Bouffard et al. (2005a,b);
Bose (2015). Our financial market is designed to work in
parallel to any electricity market. Different designs of the
latter can be accommodated. We adopt the conventional
model to make our discussion and examples concrete.
6 See Morales et al. (2012) for an alternate certainty surrogate.
3. AN EXAMPLE WITH BILATERAL
CASH-SETTLED CALL OPTION
In this section, we study a simple power system example
and illustrate that a bilateral cash-settled call option can
reduce the variance of the payments and even mitigate the
risks of negative payments or financial losses to market
participants. This example will motivate our study of a
centralized call option market in the next section.
Consider an example power system (adopted from Bose
(2015)) with two dispatchable generators and a single vari-
able renewable power producer:G := {B,P}, and R :=
{W}, where B is a base-load generator, P is a peaker
power plant, and W is a wind power producer.
Let xcapB = x
cap
P =∞, and ℓB = 0, ℓP =∞. Therefore,
B and P have infinite generation capacities. B cannot alter
its output in real-time from its forward set-point, and P
has no ramping limitations. Suppose B and P both have
linear costs of production. B has a unit marginal cost,
while P has a marginal cost of 1/ρ. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1], i.e., P
is more expensive than B.
To model the uncertainty in available wind, we let
Ω := [µ−
√
3σ, µ+
√
3σ] ⊂ R+,
and take P to be the uniform distribution over Ω. One
can verify that µ and σ2 define the mean and the variance
of the distribution, respectively. Then, the available wind
capacity in scenario ω is encoded as xωr = ω. Further,
assume that W produces power at zero cost, and that
d ≥ µ+√3σ.
This stylized example is a caricature of electricity markets
with deepening penetration of variable renewable sup-
ply. Base-load generators, specifically those based on nu-
clear technology, have limited ramping capabilities. Peaker
power plants based on internal combustion engines can
quickly ramp up their power outputs. Utilizing them to
balance variability, however, is costly. Finally, demand is
largely inflexible and can be predicted with high accuracy.
In what follows, we analyze the effect of a bilateral call
option on this market example. Insights from this example
will prove useful in the balance of the paper.
Conventional dispatch and pricing for the example power
system: The conventional dispatch model yields the
following forward dispatch and forward price.
X∗B = d− µ, X∗P = 0, X∗W = µ, P ∗ = 1.
In scenario ω, the real-time dispatch is given by
xω,∗B = d− µ, xω,∗W = min{ω, µ}, xω,∗P = (µ− ω)+,
and the real-time price is given by
pω,∗ = (1/ρ)1{ω∈[µ−√3σ,µ]}, (1)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. The dispatch
and the prices yield the following payments in scenario ω:
πωB = d− µ, πωP = (µ− ω)+/ρ, πωW = µ− (µ− ω)+/ρ.
Next, we consider a bilateral cash-settled option between
P and W . We will show that such an option can reduce
the volatility of the payments toW and P . Also of interest
is W ’s payment, when ρ <
√
3σ
µ
and the realized available
wind ω is in Ω−0 , where
Ω−0 :=
{
ω : µ−
√
3σ ≤ ω < µ(1− ρ)
}
. (2)
For such a scenario ω, we have πωW < 0. That is, W incurs
a loss for each ω ∈ Ω−0 . As we will illustrate, W can avoid
incurring such a loss in a subset of the scenarios by trading
in an option with P .
3.1 Bilateral cash-settled call option between W and P
Suppose W buys cash-settled call options from P . One
unit of such an option entitles W to a claim of a cash
payment of the difference between the real-time price and
a pre-negotiated strike price from P . We will discuss how
such an option reduces their volatility of payments.
We model the bilateral option trade between P and W as
a robust Stackelberg game (see Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999))
G as follows. Right after the day ahead market is settled
at t = 0, P announces an option price q ∈ R+ and a strike
priceK ∈ R+ for the call option it sells. Then,W responds
by purchasing ∆ ∈ R+ options. 7 This option entitles W
to a cash payment of (pω,∗ −K)+∆ from P in scenario ω.
The option costs W a fee of q∆. Assume that there is an
exogenously defined cap of
√
3σ on the amount of option
W can buy from P . The cap equals the maximum loss that
W can incur from the electricity market in real-time.
Then, the total payments to P and W in scenario ω are
given by
ΠωW (q,K,∆) := π
ω
W − q∆+ (pω,∗ −K)+∆, (3)
ΠωP (q,K,∆) := π
ω
P + q∆− (pω,∗ −K)+∆, (4)
respectively, when they agree on the triple (q,K,∆). As-
sume thatW is risk-neutral and has the correct conjectures
on the real-time prices. Then, the perceived payoff for
W in the day-ahead stage is given by E [ΠωW (q,K,∆)]. If
W believes in a different price distribution, the perceived
payoff for W can be modified accordingly. Moreover, if
W is risk-averse, one can replace E with a suitable risk-
functional. Similar considerations extend to the perceived
payoff for P .
The possible outcomes of the option trade are identified as
the set of Stackelberg equilibria (SE) of G. Precisely, we say
(q∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗)) constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium
of G, if
E [ΠωP (q
∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗))] ≥ E [ΠωP (q,K,∆∗(q,K))]
where ∆∗ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ] is the best response ofW to the
prices (q,K) ∈ R2+ announced by P . For a given (q,K),
the best response ∆∗ satisfies
E [ΠωW (q,K,∆
∗(q,K))] ≥ E [ΠωW (q,K,∆(q,K))] ,
for all ∆ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ]. In the following result, we
characterize all Stackelberg equilibria of G. In presenting
the result, we make use of the notation var[zω] to denote
the variance of a real valued map z : Ω→ R.
Proposition 1. The Stackelberg equilibria of G are given
by N1 ∪ N2, where
7 For simplicity, we allow the possibility of a fractional number of
options being bought.
N1 :=
{
(q,K,∆) | (q,K) ∈ R2+, ∆ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ],
2q +K > 1/ρ, ∆(q′,K ′) = 0 ∀ (q′,K ′) ∈ R2+
}
,
N2 :=
{
(q,K,∆) | (q,K) ∈ R2+, ∆ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ],
2q +K = 1/ρ} .
Moreover, for any (q∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗) =
√
3σ) ∈ N2, the
variances of the payments satisfy
var [Πωi (q
∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗))] − var [πωi ] = −3K∗σ2/2 < 0,
for each i ∈ {W,P}.
Proof of this Proposition can be found in Appendix A.
We remark that it can be verified that volatility in pay-
ments -measured in terms of the respective variance- will
decrease for any nontrivial SE. However, our choice of
∆∗(q∗,K∗) =
√
3σ reveals the main insights without loss
of generality. N1 describes the degenerate case, where P
andW essentially do not participate in the option market.
Proposition 1 implies that K∗ = 1/ρ − 2q∗ whenever a
trade occurs. Thus, for a given option price, the reduction
in variance increases as ρ decreases. Said differently, both
participants gain more in terms of reduction in volatility
as the peaker plant becomes more costly, leading to the
possibility of price spikes in the real-time electricity mar-
ket. Further, the mentioned reduction in variance increases
with σ. Again, the participants stand to gain more (in
terms of volatility in payments) from the option trade as
the available wind becomes more uncertain.
Finally, consider the collection of scenarios ω where W
suffers a financial loss in the energy market, i.e., πW (ω) <
0. Recall that this happens when ρ <
√
3σ
µ
and ω ∈ Ω−0 as
defined in (2). When W and P participate in the bilateral
option trade, then W suffers a loss only when ω ∈ Ω−,
where
Ω− := {ω : µ−√3σ ≤ ω < µ(1− ρ)− ρq∗√3σ}. (5)
Note that Ω− is a strict subset of Ω−0 . Thus, W is less
exposed to negative payments with the option trade.
Limitations of bilateral trading: Our stylized example
reveals the benefits of a bilateral trade in call options.
In a wholesale market with G and R describing the set
of dispatchable and variable generators, respectively, one
can conceive of |G| · |R| bilateral trade agreements. It is
difficult to convene and settle such a large number of trades
on a regular basis. To circumvent this difficulty, we propose
a central clearing mechanism for cash-settled call options
among the market participants.
4. CENTRALIZED MARKET CLEARING FOR
CASH-SETTLED CALL OPTIONS
Consider an intermediary who acts as an aggregate buyer
of such options for a collection of option sellers, and acts
as a seller of such options for a collection of option buyers.
Call this intermediary a market maker, denoted byM . An
established financial institution or even the SO can fulfill
the role of such a market maker. Let R be the set of buyers
and G be the set of sellers of the call options. The option
market proceeds as follows.
Day-ahead stage:
• M broadcasts a set of allowable trades A0, given by
A0 := [0, q]×
[
0,K
]× [0,∆] ⊂ R3+,
to all the market participants G ∪R.
• Each i ∈ G ∪ R submits an acceptable set of option
trades, denoted by Ai ⊆ A0. 8
• M correctly conjectures the real-time prices pω,∗ in
each scenario ω, and solves the following stochastic
optimization problem to clear the option market.
maximize E[fω],
subject to∑
g∈G
∆g =
∑
r∈R
∆r,
(qg,Kg,∆g) ∈ Ag, (qr ,Kr,∆r) ∈ Ar,
δωg ∈ [0,∆g],∑
g∈G
δωg =
∑
r∈R
∆r1{pω,∗≥Kr}

 P− a.s.,
for each g ∈ G, r ∈ R,
(6)
over (qg,Kg,∆g) ∈ R3+, F -measurable maps δωg : Ω →
[0,∆g] for each g ∈ G, and (qr,Kr,∆r) ∈ R3+ for each
r ∈ R. The function f is a real-valued F -measurable
map over all the optimization variables.
• Buyer r pays q∗r∆∗r to M .• M pays q∗g∆∗g to seller g.• M is left with a day-ahead merchandising surplus of∑
r∈R
q∗r∆
∗
r −
∑
g∈R
q∗g∆
∗
g.
Real-time stage:
• Scenario ω is realized, and the real-time price of elec-
tricity pω,∗ is computed by M .
• M pays (pω,∗ −K∗r )+∆∗r to buyer r.
• Seller g pays (pω,∗ −K∗g )+ δω,∗g to M .• M is left with a real-time merchandising surplus of
−
∑
r∈R
(pω,∗ −K∗r )+∆∗r +
∑
g∈G
(
pω,∗ −K∗g
)+
δω,∗g .
Explaining the market clearing procedure: The volume
of call options bought by the renewable power producers
are deemed to equal the volume sold by the dispatchable
generators at the forward stage. The option prices and the
volumes are decided in a way that each triple (qi,Ki,∆i)
lies in the set of acceptable trades Ai for each participant
i ∈ G∪R. In real-time, if the price pω,∗ exceeds the strike
price Kr for a renewable power producer, it will exercise
its right to receive the cash amount (pω,∗ −Kr)+∆r. The
total volume of encashed call options equals the sum of ∆r
over the set of buyers for whom the spot price exceeds their
strike price. M allocates this volume among the option
sellers. That is, it decides δωg ∈ [0,∆g] for each seller g in
a way that the volume of call options encashed equals the
total volume allocated to the sellers.
How market participant i decides Ai: Consider a seller
g ∈ G who expects a revenue πωg in scenario ω. By
participating in the energy market and the option trade
with the triple (qg,Kg,∆g), she receives a payoff of
8 One can fix a parametric description, where market participants
communicate their choices of parameters.
πωg + qg∆g − (pω,∗ −Kg)+ δωg ,
ifM allocates δωg ∈ [0,∆g] in scenario ω. Having no control
over δωg , assume that seller g regards M as adversary.
That is, she conjectures that M chooses δωg in a way that
minimizes g’s payoff in scenario ω:
Πωg (qg,Kg,∆g) := π
ω
g + qg∆g − (pω,∗ −Kg)+∆g.
Then, a risk-neutral market participant will accept the
trade defined by (qg,Kg,∆g), if
E
[
Πωg (qg,Kg,∆g)
] ≥ E [πωg ] .
That is, Ag is comprised of the trades that satisfy the
above inequality. Similarly, Ar for a risk-neutral buyer
r ∈ R is comprised of the trades defined by (qr,Kr,∆r)
that satisfy E [Πωr (qr,Kr,∆r)] ≥ E [πωr ] , where
Πωr (qr,Kr,∆r) := π
ω
r − qr∆r + (pω,∗ −Kr)+∆r.
If a market participant is risk-averse, one can replace
the expectation with an appropriate risk-functional; see
Section 5 for more details.
The objective function fω: The function fω appearing
in (6) depends on the nature of the market maker. As an
example, considerM to be a risk-neutral profit-maximizer.
Then, fω is the merchandising surplus for M in scenario
ω, given by
MS
ω :=
∑
r∈R
qr∆r −
∑
g∈G
qg∆g
−
∑
r∈R
(pω,∗ −Kr)+∆r +
∑
g∈G
(pω,∗ −Kg)+ δωg .
4.1 Example power system with centralized option market
Recall that we presented a bilateral trade of a call option
between the wind power producer W and a peaker power
plant P in the example in Section 3. We now reconsider
the same example and demonstrate how the centralized
clearing mechanism generalizes the bilateral trade.
Let W be the only option buyer and P be the only option
seller. M decides A0, the set of acceptable option prices,
strike prices, and trade volumes. For illustrative purposes
and to avoid trivial trades in our discussion, consider
A0 := (0, 1
ρ
] × (0, 1
ρ
]× (0,
√
3σ] ⊂ R3++.
We assume that M caps the trade volume to equal the
maximum energy shortfall in available wind from its for-
ward contract X∗W . Assuming the players to be risk-
neutral, the set of acceptable trades for P andW are given
by
AP = {(qP ,KP ,∆P ) ∈ A0 :
KP + 2qP ≥ 1/ρ,∆P ∈ (0,
√
3σ]}, (7)
AW = {(qW ,KW ,∆W ) ∈ A0 :
KW + 2qW ≤ 1/ρ,∆W ∈ (0,
√
3σ]}. (8)
Assuming M to be risk-neutral, she solves (at day-ahead)
Figure 1. Sets of acceptable trades AP and AW with σ = 0.2 and ρ = 0.5 are respectively drawn on the left and right. These sets are for
the case when P and W are risk-neutral.
maximize
E[qW∆W − qP∆P
− (pω,∗ −KW )+ ∆W + (pω,∗ −KP )+ δωP ],
subject to
∆P = ∆W , (qP ,KP ,∆P ) ∈ AP , (qW ,KW ,∆W ) ∈ AW ,
δωP ∈ [0,∆P ],
δωP = ∆W1{pω,∗≥KW }
}
P− a.s.,
(9)
We characterize the optimal solutions of (9) in the follow-
ing result, whose proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. The triple (q∗i ,K
∗
i ,∆
∗
i ) ∈ R3+ given by
2q∗i +K
∗
i =
1
ρ
and ∆∗i ∈ (0,
√
3σ],
for each i ∈ {W,P}, constitutes the optimal solution of
(9). Moreover, at ∆∗i =
√
3σ, the variances of the total
payments satisfy
var[Πωi (q
∗
i ,K
∗
i ,∆
∗
i )]− var[πωi ] = −3K∗i σ2/2 < 0.
We note that volatility in payments for W and P always
decrease, for any other optimal ∆∗W and ∆
∗
P . However, we
restrict our attention to ∆∗W = ∆
∗
P =
√
3σ for illustrative
purposes. Proposition 2 reveals that the centralized option
market allows both W and P to reduce their payment
volatilities. This reduction closely resembles the one in
Proposition 1. The exact value of reduction, however,
depends on the strike prices that M chooses. The mer-
chandising surplus of M in scenario ω is given by
MS
ω,∗ =
{
(q∗P − q∗W )
√
3σ, if ω ≤ µ,
(q∗W − q∗P )
√
3σ, otherwise.
The above expression implies that the expected merchan-
dising surplus of the market maker remains zero, irrespec-
tive of the choice of q∗W and q
∗
P . A risk-neutral market
maker is agnostic to that choice, which however affects
the volatilities of the market participants differently. The
choice q∗W = q
∗
P yields the outcome for the bilateral trade,
in which case the market maker only facilitates passing
the payments from one player to another in each scenario
ω. We note that such a choice will be appropriate, if M is
motivated by a social goal, e.g., when M is the SO. 9 Our
discussion serves to illustrate that the bilateral trade is a
special case of the centralized clearing mechanism.
9 By settingMSω to zero for all scenarios, the optimization problem
(9) can be reformulated into a system of nonlinear equations, which
can be solved by the widely used Newton-Raphson’s method, and it
can be verified that it converges to q∗
W
= q∗
P
.
Consider the case where another generator joins the mar-
ket, a peaker plant P ′ that has a linear cost of production
with a marginal cost higher than that of P . Again, suppose
P ′ has an infinite capacity of production. It can be verified
that P ′ will never be dispatched, and hence, does not get
paid from the electricity market. P ′ can still participate in
the options trade, wherein she fulfills the role of a seller.
M then allocates the option demand from W between P
and P ′. One can show that the profits and losses from
the options trade in various scenarios will then be shared
between P and P ′. While the option trade will still reduce
the volatility of the payments for P , the absolute reduction
in volatility will be lower. The payments to W , however,
remain unaffected by the presence of P ′.
5. GENERALIZATIONS
Recall that we described the set of acceptable trades Ai for
each i ∈ G∪R by assuming each market participant to be
risk-neutral in Section 4. A trade, identified by the triple
(qi,Ki,∆i), is deemed acceptable, if the expected payment
from participation in the option trade together with the
electricity market improves upon the expected payment
from the electricity market alone. Market participants in
electricity markets are known to be risk-averse in practice;
e.g., see Bjorgan et al. (1999); Deng and Oren (2006). Here,
we model such risk-aversion and demonstrate its effect on
the sets of acceptable trades.
Assume that a risk-averse market participant i ∈ G ∪ R
finds a trade triple (qi,Ki,∆i) acceptable, if
CVaRαi [−Πωi (qi,Ki,∆i)] ≤ CVaRαi [−πωi ] , (10)
where
CVaRα [z
ω] := min
t∈R
{
t+
1
1− αE
[
(zω − t)+
]}
,
z is a real-valued F -measurable map, and α ∈ [0, 1) is
a parameter that quantifies the extent of risk-aversion.
CVaR is the popular conditional value at risk functional
that describes a coherent risk measure; see FO¨llmer and
Schied (2010) for a survey. If zω is the monetary loss in
scenario ω, CVaRα [z
ω] equals the expected loss over the
α% scenarios that result in the highest losses.
Consider the set of acceptable trades described by (10) for
market participant i, when her parameter for risk-aversion
is αi. To make its dependence on αi explicit, call this set
Ai(αi). The risk-neutral case is modeled as αi = 0. The
closer αi is to 1, the more risk-averse i is. Notice that the
set Ai(0) depends on the payments from the option trade
alone. When αi > 0, the set Ai(αi) also depends on the
payments from the electricity market.
Figure 2. The boundaries of the sets of acceptable trades AP and AW are portrayed respectively on the left and the right, for the example
in Section 4.1 with µ = 1, σ = 0.4, ρ = 0.5. We let both P and W measure risk-aversion using CVaRα. The sets are computed by
leveraging the technique outlined in (Hong and Liu, 2011, equation (6)).
Recall that we characterized AW (0) in (8) whenW is risk-
neutral. To study the effect of risk-aversion, we plot the
boundary of AW (αW ) for various values of αW . In these
plots, we let the cap on ∆ be 2
√
3/5 to better illustrate
the sets in Figure 2 (acceptable trades are on the left of
the boundary). The larger the αW is, the larger is the set
of acceptable trades. Intuitively, a more risk-averseW will
accept higher option/strike prices to mitigate the real-time
financial risks. In a sense, CVaRαW puts more weight on
monetary losses as αW grows. For this example, we have(
qW ,KW , 2
√
3/5σ
)
∈ AW (αW )
=⇒ (qW ,KW ,∆W ) ∈ AW (αW ) ∀ ∆W ∈ (0, 2
√
3/5σ].
The boundary of AP is portrayed in Figure 2, and the
acceptable set is on the right of the boundary. The changes
in the sets AP (α) and AW (α) with α are qualitatively
different. The difference stems from the fact that W is
exposed to negative payments while P is not. In a sense,
more risk aversion makes W more prone to purchase the
options, while P becomes less likely to sell more options.
Effect of incorrect price/payment conjectures: If a mar-
ket participant, say W , has an incorrect price conjecture,
denoted by pˆω,∗, then her set of acceptable trades AˆW can
be different from AW . While we assumed in our examples
that participants have correct price conjectures, our model
can be generalized to the case where a seller or a buyer bids
an incorrect set. Furthermore, even if W has the correct
conjecture, she might have an incentive to misrepresent
her acceptability set. Such considerations are beyond the
scope of this paper and can be investigated in future work.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored the design of a centralized cash-
settled options market that can be implemented in parallel
with an existing electricity market. Through stylized ex-
amples, we have demonstrated that our design leads to re-
duction in the volatility in payments. Additionally, we have
shown that a renewable supplier is less exposed to negative
payments under uncertainty, compared to a conventional
approach. The paper serves as a stepping stone for a more
comprehensive market with deep integration of renewable
supply. An attractive feature of the proposed design is
that it can be applied to any existing electricity market,
making its implementation less complex. Generalizations
include: effect of risk-aversion, effect of price conjectures,
computational aspects, and multi-period considerations.
Appendix A. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
With a slight abuse of notation, we sometimes use ∆ for
∆(q,K). Suppose P chooses the pair (q,K) ∈ R2+. Then,
the payoff of W from the option trade alone is given by
V ωW (q,K,∆) := Π
ω
W (q,K,∆)− πωW .
Utilizing the relation in (3), we have
E [V ωW (q,K,∆)]
=


−q∆, if K > 1/ρ,
−∆
2
(2q +K − 1/ρ) , otherwise. (A.1)
We characterize the best response of W to the choice
of (q,K) by P . Call it the set-valued map ∆∗(q,K). If
K > 1/ρ, then ∆∗(q,K) = {0}. Otherwise,
• If 2q +K < 1/ρ, then ∆∗(q,K) = {√3σ}.
• If 2q +K = 1/ρ, then W is agnostic to the choice of
∆, and hence, ∆∗(q,K) = [0,
√
3σ].
• If 2q +K > 1/ρ, then ∆∗(q,K) = {0}.
Similarly, define V ωP (q,K,∆) := Π
ω
P (q,K,∆)− πωP , as the
payoff of P from the option trade. Then, (3) and (4) imply
that
E [V ωP (q,K,∆)] = −E [V ωW (q,K,∆)] . (A.2)
Given the best response ofW , we have the following cases.
• If 2q+K < 1/ρ, then E [V ωP (q,K,∆)] < 0, and hence
no trades will occur and P must choose (q,K) such
that 2q +K ≥ 1/ρ.
• If 2q +K = 1/ρ, then E [V ωP (q,K,∆)] = 0, and with
∆∗(q,K) = [0,
√
3σ], this is the only case at which
nontrivial trades occur.
• If 2q + K > 1/ρ, and with ∆∗(q,K) = {0}, trivial
trades occur.
Thus, the Stackelberg equilibria of G are given by N1∪N2,
where
N1 :=
{
(q,K,∆) | (q,K) ∈ R2+, ∆ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ],
2q +K > 1/ρ, ∆(q′,K ′) = 0 ∀ (q′,K ′) ∈ R2+
}
,
N2 :=
{
(q,K,∆) | (q,K) ∈ R2+, ∆ : R2+ → [0,
√
3σ],
2q +K = 1/ρ} .
For any Stackelberg equilibrium (q∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗) =√
3σ) ∈ N2, we have V ω,∗W = q∗
√
3σ, if ω < µ. Otherwise,
V ω,∗W = −q∗
√
3σ. The differences in variances are given by
var [ΠωW (q
∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗))]− var [πωW ]
= 2cov(πωW , V
ω,∗
W ) + var
[
V ω,∗W
]
,
where πωW = µ − (µ − ω)+/ρ. Using the fact that 1/ρ =
2q∗ +K∗, it can be verified upon substitutions that
var [ΠωW (q
∗,K∗,∆∗(q∗,K∗))]− var [πωW ] = −3K∗σ2/2 < 0.
For P , we have πωP = µ − πωW and V ω,∗P = −V ω,∗W , and
the statement of the Proposition can be easily verified.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The constraints in (9) imply that ∆P = ∆W . By (1), it
can be checked that
E[MSω] = (2qW +KW − 1/ρ)∆W
2
+ (−2qP −KP + 1/ρ)∆P
2
,
Given AP described in (7), M must choose 2qP +KP =
1/ρ, and it will be agnostic to ∆P . Similarly for W , M
must choose 2qW + KW = 1/ρ, and hence the maximum
is achieved at
2q∗i +K
∗
i = 1/ρ and ∆P = ∆W ∈ (0,
√
3σ],
where i ∈ {W,P}. The proof of the variances follows the
exact steps in the proof of Proposition 1.
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